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Appellee Holladay City, by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully submits
its Brief of Appellee.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code. Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes and ordinances are determinative:
•

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(l) ("No person may challenge in district court
a municipality's land use decision made under this chapter, or under a
regulation made under authority of this chapter, until that person has
exhausted the person's administrative remedies as provided in Part 7,
Appeal Authority and Variances, if applicable.");

•

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(2) ("Any person having a claim against a
governmental entity, or against its employee for an act or omission
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope
of employment, or under color of authority shall file a written notice of
claim with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or
not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental");
and

-1-

•

Holladay Code of Ordinances 13.84.100 ("Any person shall have the right to
appeal the decision of the community development director to the planning
commission by filing a letter with the planning commission within ten (10)
days of the community development director's decision, stating the reason
for the appeal and requesting a hearing before the planning commission at
the earliest regular meeting of the commission.").
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal arises out of a denial of a land use application filed by
Appellant/Plaintiff Holladay Towne Center LLC ("HTC") for a conditional use permit
from Appellee/Defendant Holladay City ("Holladay" or the "City"). HTC filed this
action rather than an administrative appeal seeking to compel the City to approve its
application and pay HTC damages. The City filed a motion for summary judgment
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56 and a motion to dismiss pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). The District Court granted summary judgment against HTC on all of its claims
because HTC failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. R. 163-64 (Judgment and
Order Granting Holladay City's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss
("Judgment and Order"), at till- 4 )- Furthermore, the District Court found that it lacked
jurisdiction over HTC on all of its claims because HTC failed to provide notice of claims
as required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("UGIA"). R.164 (Judgment and
Order, at 1fi[5-6). The District Court also separately dismissed HTC's Second Claim for
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Relief (Vested Rights) and Sixth Claim for Relief (Public Clamor) pursuant to Utah R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because Utah does not recognize a cause of action for either "vested
rights" or "public clamor." R.164 (Judgment and Order, at ^7).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 1
1.

On January 30, 2006, HTC filed a Development Review Application with

Holladay City (the "Application"), requesting a conditional use permit to construct a
Walgreen's Drugstore at 2263 East Murray Holladay Road, Holladay, Utah (the
"Property"). See, R.44 (Affidavit of Paul Allred ("Allred Aff"), at 1f3); R.162 (Judgment
and Order, at ^jl).
2.

At the time the Application was submitted, the Property was zoned C-2.

See R.44 (Allred Aff., at fj).
3.

Additionally, the Holladay Village Center Overlay Zone (Holladay

Ordinance 13.70) and the Holladay Village Center development standards (Holladay
Ordinance 13.71) had been created, approved, enacted, and applied to the Property in
question at the time the Application was submitted to Holladay. See R.44 (Allred Aff, at
15).
1

Although several of HTC's statements in its Appellant Brief contradict the District
Court's findings, HTC has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the District
Court's findings. Consequently, HTC should be precluded from challenging any
such findings. United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain
Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ^|25, 140 P.3d 1200 ("When parties fail to perform this critical
task, we can rely on that failure to affirm the lower court's findings of fact.").
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4.

The Application did not meet the C-2 zoning requirements. See R.44

(AllredAff, atf6). 2
5.

Among other things, the site plan submitted with the Application failed to

provide a 20-foot front setback and failed to dedicate an additional 7 feet of property to
allow for the required 40-foot half-width right-of-way for the expansion of MurrayHolladay Road. See R.44 (Allred Aff., at f7).
6.

On February 24, 2006, Holladay, through its Community Development

Director, informed HTC in writing of the deficiencies in its Application and requested
that the Application and site plan be revised. See R.44 (Allred Aff, at 1J8); R.162
(Judgment and Order, at <P). A copy of the February 24, 2006 letter is found in the
Record at R.48-49.
7.

HTC never responded to Holladay's request for revisions to the

Application. See R.44 (Allred Aff, at TJ9).
8.

Accordingly, on March 30, 2006, Holladay delivered a letter to HTC

In its Statement of Facts, HTC argues that "[t]he Application met all City zoning
ordinances and requirements, including parking, landscaping, and building
height." Brief of Appellant at 5, f 1, citing to R.87 (Affidavit of Tom Hulbert, at
fflf 6-7). However, HTC does not dispute that the Application did not comply with
all of the requirements of the C-2 zone. As Mr. Hulbert states in his affidavit,
"Holladay Center's land use application met all the requirements of the C-2 zone,
when those requirements were not superseded by the requirements of the Holladay
Village Center Zone and Holladay Village Center Overlay Zone." R.87 (Affidavit
ofTom Hulbert, at ^fij 6-7).
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informing HTC that the Application was denied and refunding their application fee. See
R.44-45 (Allred Aff., at ^JIO); R.162 (Judgment and Order, at P ) . A copy of the March
30, 2006 letter is found in the Record at R.51-52.
9.

HTC did not appeal the March 30, 2006 decision to the Planning

Commission, as required by Holladay Code of Ordinances 13.84.100. See R.45 (Allred
Aff, at Tflfl 1-12); R.162 (Judgment and Order, at ffi[4-5).
10.

On May 1, 2006, HTC filed this action seeking to compel the City to

approve its Application and obtain damages from the City. See R.5-6 (HTC Complaint,
at 1fl[ 1-7); R. 162-63 (Judgment and Order, at \6).
11.

HTC did not provide written notice of any claim against Holladay before

commencing this action. See R.40-41 (Affidavit of Stephanie Carlson, at f4); R.163
(Judgment and Order, at f7).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In this case, Appellant/Plaintiff Holladay Towne Center LLC filed an application
for a conditional use permit with Appellee/Defendant Holladay City on January 30, 2006.
On February 24, 2006, Holladay requested additional information and asked that certain
revisions to the Application be made in order to bring the Application into compliance
with the applicable law. HTC never responded. On March 30, 2006, the City
Community Development Director rejected the Application for failure to provide
necessary information and make necessary corrections to the Application.
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HTC never appealed this decision to the Holladay planning commission as it was
both allowed and required to do pursuant to Holladay Ordinance 13.84.100. Instead, on
May 1, 2006, HTC filed a complaint in Third District Court seeking to overturn the City
Community Development Director's decision and obtain damages.
Utah law forbids HTC's claims because, among other things, HTC completely
ignored the administrative process for appealing the City Community Development
Director's decision set forth in Holladay City Code 13.84.100 and never provided the
City notice of its claims as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(2). Both of these
requirements are statutory prerequisites to filing a claim in district court.
On appeal, HTC now attempts to justify these failures by arguing that it: (i) did
not need to file an administrative appeal because to do so would have been "futile," and
(ii) did not need to provide notice of its equitable claims (making no mention of its legal
claims) because such claims are excluded from the requirements of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, 63-3Od-101, et seq. It has also taken issue with the District
Court's conclusion that "vested rights" is not a separate cause of action under Utah law.
However, HTC's arguments are both substantively wrong and procedurally barred, as
illustrated herein.
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ARGUMENT
L

APPELLANT HTC FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
HTC has not marshaled the evidence as required by Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure. Instead, it has simply realleged facts that are inconsistent
with the District Court's findings of fact. For example, in its Statement of Facts, HTC
argues that:
[p]rior to receipt of the Denial and Rejection, HTC had never been told that
its Application did not comply with any applicable zoning ordinances, or
that its Application would be denied. To the contrary, the City had
affirmatively represented that HTC's Application complied with all
applicable zoning ordinances, and led HTC to believe that the Application
had been positively received and was being processed accordingly.
Brief of Appellant at p.6, ^4. However, the District Court found that u[o]n February 24,
2006, Holladay, through its Community Development Director, informed the Plaintiff of
deficiencies in its Application and requested that the Application and site plan be
revised." R. 162 (Judgment and Order, at TJ2). Because it has failed to marshal the
evidence, the District Court's findings of fact should be affirmed.
In order to meet its obligation to marshal the evidence, HTC was required to
"temporarily remove [their] own prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's position;
[they] must play the devil's advocate. In so doing, appellants must present the evidence in
a light most favorable to the trial court and not attempt to construe the evidence in a light
favorable to their case . . . . In sum, to properly marshal the evidence the challenging
party must demonstrate how the court found the facts from the evidence and then explain
why those findings contradict the clear weight of the evidence." United Park City Mines
Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ^[26, 140 P.3d 1200 (alteration
in original)(interior quotations omitted). As the Utah Supreme Court has recently
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instructed, "[e]ven where the defendants purport to challenge only the legal ruling, as
here, if a determination of the correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is
extremely fact-sensitive, the [appellants] also have a duty to marshal the evidence." Id. at
125.
The Utah Supreme Court has "repeatedly . . . warned of the grim consequences
parties face when they fail to fulfill the marshaling requirement. When parties fail to
perform this critical task, we can rely on that failure to affirm the lower court's findings
of fact." Id, at^|27. The District Court's findings of fact should therefore be affirmed
and HTC should be precluded from raising factual arguments on appeal.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AGAINST HTC BASED ON ITS FAILURE TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
The Court should uphold the district court's summary judgment that HTC "failed

to exhaust its administrative remedies by appealing the March 30, 2006 decision to either
the Planning Commission or the City Council, as required by Holladay Ordinances §§ 1384.100 and 13-84.110." R.163 (Judgment and Order, atf3). Utah law expressly
provides that "[n]o person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use
decision . . . until that person has exhausted the person's administrative remedies." Utah
Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(l). As the Utah Supreme Court has explicitly held, "[wjhere the
legislature has imposed a specific exhaustion requirement such as that contained in
section 10-9-1001 [the predecessor to section 10-9a-801]? we will enforce it strictly."
Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7,1J17, 67 P.3d 466.
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Because HTC failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, the District Court had
"no choice but to dismiss it." Maverick Country Stores, Inc. v. Indus. Comm 'n of Utah,
860 P.2d 944, 947-48 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (where party failed to exhaust administrative
remedies prior to seeking judicial review, "[w]e have no jurisdiction over the first appeal
and have no choice but to dismiss it"); see also McFadden v. Cache County Corp., 2006
UT App 256, ^J4 ("[D]enial of the application was an administrative decision, which
necessitated an appeal to the Board in order to exhaust all administrative remedies.
Because McFadden failed to exhaust all administrative remedies, the trial court did not
err in granting Defendants summary judgment as to this issue.").
On appeal, HTC argues that pursuing administrative remedies would have been
futile and therefore was not required. This argument is based on a line of cases
apparently beginning with the Utah Supreme Court's statement in Johnson v. Utah State
Retirement Office that exhaustion of administrative remedies "may not be necessary
when it would serve no useful purpose." Johnson v. Utah State Ret. Office, 621 P.2d
1234, 1237 (Utah 1980). It is noteworthy, however, that in the very next sentence the
Johnson decision explained that:
[Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust in this case deprived the retirement board of
the opportunity to hear, analyze, and critically review a matter within the
purview of its particular responsibility and expertise. The review board's
view of the meaning of the terms of the Act, and possibly the manner in
which the retirement fund is administered, is information which a
reviewing court might find necessary to have to make an informed decision.
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Id. This strongly implies that the administrative appeals process serves a useful purpose
when, as in the present instance, it provides a public body an opportunity to review and
correct, if necessary, an administrative decision with which a potential litigant disagrees.
Subsequent decisions discussing exhaustion of administrative remedies have
repeatedly affirmed the notion that the opportunity to correct a decision is an important
part of the administrative appeals process. State Tax Comm 'n v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519,
526 (Utah 1989) ("Iverson was required to utilize the established administrative
procedures. His failure to do so deprived the commission of the opportunity to hear,
analyze, critically review, and possibly correct a matter within the purview of its
particular responsibility and expertise."); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm yn, 861 P.2d 414 (Utah 1993) ("Underpinning this doctrine is the principle that
before an error is considered on appeal, an agency should have the opportunity to correct
it."); Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds v. Park CityMun. Corp., 2007 UT App 287,
%\ ("Plaintiffs' failure to properly appeal the planning commission's decision prevented
the city council from undertaking a proper administrative review of the prior land use
decision, as is contemplated by the Park City Code. Given the absence of a proper
appeal, the trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint on the ground that
Plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies.").
In fact, since the Johnson decision, the courts appear to have found that
administrative appeals would serve "no useful purpose" only in situations where the
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administrative body lacks the jurisdiction to grant the relief sought by a potential litigant.
See Hatton-Wardv. Salt Lake City Corp., 828 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
(finding "nothing in the plain and unambiguous language of either the whistle blower
statute or the civil service statute suggesting a claimant must first bring a whistle blower
claim to the Commission before proceeding in state court"); TDM, Inc. v. Tax Comm %
2004 UT App 433, \5, 103 P.3d 190 ("[W]here purely legal questions are raised that
cannot be finally determined in an administrative proceeding, the pursuit of the
administrative proceeding may serve no purpose."). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
held that even when the administrative body is not capable of providing the desired
remedy, an exhaustion of administrative remedies may still be required if administrative
review could obviate the need for determination of legal issues. See Nebeker v. Utah
State Tax Comm % 2001 UT 74, ^16, 34 P.3d 180 (Utah 2001).
The facts of Nebeker, which HTC cites in support of its argument that no
exhaustion of administrative remedies was required, support the conclusion that this case
does not fall within the exception. In Nebeker, the appellee Utah State Tax Commission
determined that the appellant trucking company was deficient in payment of the Utah
special fuel tax and therefore imposed a twelve percent interest rate on the amount it
owed. Id. at Tfl, 6. The appellant filed suit against the Commission in district court
alleging that the interest rate was unconstitutional. Id. at \1. The district court dismissed
the claim, ruling that the court lacked jurisdiction due to appellant's failure to exhaust
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administrative remedies. Id. at^|8. Appellant argued on appeal that requiring exhaustion
of administrative remedies would serve no useful purpose because the only claims raised
before the district court were constitutional claims over which the Tax Commission had
no jurisdiction. Id. at ^[15. Although the Utah Supreme Court agreed that the
constitutional challenge was not within the Tax Commission's jurisdiction, the Court
nevertheless held that exhaustion was required. Id. at ^[16-20. According to this Court,
"to hold otherwise would create procedural confusion and piecemeal litigation." Id. at
^[19. Furthermore, the administrative appeal would have provided the Tax Commission
notice of a potential constitutional challenge, allowing it a chance to rethink its position.
See id. at ^[20. Additionally, ;"[j]udicial attention to the constitutional issue, as well as
other issues, will be better framed by the structure of a factual context' developed before
the agency." Id., quoting Johnson, 621 P.2d at 1237. "Lastly, to hold otherwise would
give a petitioner a way to revive claims he had originally lost due to his own lack of
diligence in failing to exhaust his administrative remedies." Id.
Under the logic of Nebeker, exhaustion of administrative remedies must be
required here, where HTC never provided the Planning Commission the opportunity to
rethink a determination made by a staff member. See e.g., Johnson, 621 P.2d at 1237.
Furthermore, in the context of an appeal of the City's interpretation of the requirements
of its own ordinances, it would be poor public policy to allow judicial challenges to land
use decisions when the proper administrative bodies are not provided an opportunity to
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review and interpret the requirements at issue due to a litigant's failure to exhaust the
administrative remedies provided.
HTC nonetheless argues that, under Patterson, it should be excused from its
failure to appeal the City's denial of its land use application because an administrative
appeal would have been "absolutely futile."3 However, Patterson does not directly
recognize futility as an exception to the unambiguous requirement of Utah Code §10-9a801 that "[n]o person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use decision
. . . until that person has exhausted the person's administrative remedies." Utah Code
Ann. §10-9a-801(l). Although the Pattersons argued that they should be excused from
the exhaustion requirement because "they would suffer irreparable harm if required to
exhaust administrative remedies, and that the exhaustion process would be futile,"
Patterson, at ^[16, the Court's response to this argument was as follows:
We decline the apparent invitation to peruse Pattersons' lengthy list of
allegations in search of specific facts supporting their claims of irreparable
harm and futility. We note only that allegations of unfairness in the day-to
day relationship between Pattersons and City staff do not support a claim
that the entire administrative appeals process is inoperative or unavailable.

We note for the Court that HTC never briefed the futility argument in the District
Court. Instead, it raised the issue for the first time in oral argument. See R. 147-48
(Memorandum Decision).
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Id. at f20. A perception of futility was not recognized by the Court as an exception to
strict compliance in Patterson and should not be recognized here.4
Even if perceived futility were a justifiable basis for excusing HTC from the
jurisdictional prerequisite of exhaustion of administrative remedies, nothing in the facts
HTC has cited supports its claim that the entire Holiaday City administrative process was
"inoperative or unavailable." Brief of Appellant, at p. 10. Instead, the facts HTC alleges
merely show that HTC failed to take advantage of a well-defined administrative process
that would have allowed the Planning Commission to address HTC's concerns and make
any necessary corrections.
HTC attempts to justify its failure to appeal the Community Development
Director's denial of its application and simultaneously demonstrate the unavailability of
the administrative process by pointing to language in the letter stating that City staff had
been instructed by the Planning Commission "not to bring applications before them that
do not comply" with the requirements of the applicable City zoning ordinances. Brief of
Appellant, at p.6.5 This statement, however, merely underscores the fundamental

4

HTC also cites Condie v. Condie, 2006 UT App 243, f 15, 139 P.3d 271 in support
of its futility argument. Brief of Appellant, at p. 10. In fact, the language quoted by
HTC relates to whether a party should have asked for attorney fees in a bankruptcy
proceeding. Condie, at ]fl2. It says nothing about a specific statutory requirement
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies as a jurisdictional prerequisite to
judicial review.

5

HTC later argues in its brief that "the Community Development Director had been
'instructed' by the Planning Commission not to bring the Application." Brief of
Footnote continued.
- 14-

purpose of the City's administrative appeals process: to provide applicants with a
mechanism for bringing their disagreements with City staff before the Planning
Commission.
HTC argues, as further evidence that exhausting administrative remedies would
have been futile, that before receiving the denial letter from the Community Development
Director, "the City had never before told HTC that its Application did not comply with
applicable zoning ordinances, or that it would be denied." Brief of Appellant, at p. 11.
This is simply not supported by the record. The undisputed record shows that the City
informed HTC, by letter dated February 24, 2006, of numerous deficiencies in its
Application and that the Application and site plan would have to be revised in order to
meet the requirements of the applicable City zoning ordinances. See R.22-60A
(Combined Memorandum in Support of Holladay City's Motion for Summary Judgment
and Motion to Dismiss ("Support Memorandum")), including R.23 (at ^|6), 44 (at ^8) and
48; R.179 (Hearing Transcript), including at p. 18.
Appellant, at p. 13. As HTC recites in its statement of facts, however, the
instruction was "not to bring applications before them that do not comply." Brief
of Appellant, at p.6 (emphasis added). HTC apparently overlooked both the lack
of capitalization and the presence of the plural in the letter, both of which suggest
that the quoted statement was not a specific direction regarding HTC's
application; it was instead a general, common sense instruction that the Planning
Commission did not want City staff to present applications that City staff did not
believe complied with the requirements of the City zoning ordinances. If the
applicant disagreed with City staff and believed the application did comply, the
Planning Commission would still review the application, in the context of an
administrative appeal.
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HTC also asserts that the March 30, 2006 Holladay City Council decision is
evidence of the futility of exhausting administrative remedies. This decision, as HTC
described it, nplace[d] a six-month moratorium on new land use applications in the HVC
zone, where HTC's Property is located." Brief of Appellant, at p.12. However, the
moratorium is entirely irrelevant to the issue of whether or not HTC was required to
appeal the economic development director's decision to deny their land use application.
As even HTC has noted, the moratorium applied to "new land use applications in the
HVC zone." Brief of Appellant, at p.6 (emphasis added). The moratorium did not apply
to applications, like HTC's, that had previously been filed and certainly did not prevent
HTC from appealing the Community Development Director's denial of the application.
Because exhaustion of administrative remedies: (i) is a jurisdictional prerequisite
to judicial review that must be strictly enforced; (ii) would have provided the Planning
Commission the opportunity to review and, if necessary, correct a staff member's
decision; and (iii) would therefore not have been "futile," this Court should affirm the
District Court's summary judgment against HTC for failure to comply with the
exhaustion requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801.
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III.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT DISMISSING HTC'S CLAIMS FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF
BECAUSE THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UGIA APPLY AND
HTC HAS FAILED TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE OF UGIA'S
APPLICABILITY TO ITS EQUITABLE CLAIMS
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that HTC does not raise on appeal

whether its constitutional takings, and other legal, claims were barred by its failure to
provide notice under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("UGIA"). Instead, HTC has
appealed whether HTC had a duty to comply with the notice provisions of the UGIA as to
several of its claims because HTC's First Claim for Relief (Arbitrary, Capricious and/or
Illegal Decision), Second Claim for Relief (Vested Rights), Fourth Claim for Relief
(Facial Invalidity), and Fifth Claim for Relief (Estoppel) "seek equitable relief. . . . [and
t]he UGIA applies only to claims for money damages." Brief of Appellant, at p. 14. HTC
has therefore conceded that, as to its legal claims, its failure to comply with UGIA's
notice of claim provisions deprived the District Court of subject matter jurisdiction.
R. 164 (Judgment and Order, at ^6).
With regard to HTC's equitable claims, this Court is precluded from considering
the merits of this argument because HTC failed to present this argument in the court
below.6 While HTC did argue in its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion

6

As the appellant in this appeal, HTC has the burden of presenting a record
demonstrating preservation of an issue for appeal. Wilde v Wilde, 2001 UT App
318, n.5, 35 P.3d 341. In attempting to demonstrate how and where it preserved
the issue for appeal, HTC merely references its Memorandum in Opposition to
Footnote continued.
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for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss ("Opposing Memorandum") that persons
appealing land use decisions under the Utah Land Use Development and Management
Act ("LUDMA") are not subject to the UGIA notice requirements, R.80-81, HTC only
raised the UGIA's specific applicability to equitable claims for the first time on appeal.
Because HTC failed to assert in the District Court that the UGIA notice requirements do
not apply to claims for equitable relief, the Court is precluded from considering this
argument on appeal.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DIMISSED HTC'S SECOND
CLAIM FOR RELIEF BECAUSE UTAH LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE A
CLAIM FOR "VESTED RIGHTS" AND HTC WAIVED THIS ISSUE IN
THE COURT BELOW
HTC also argues on appeal that the District Court erred in dismissing its Second

Claim for Relief for 'Vested rights" on the basis that "Utah law does not recognize a
claim for 'vested rights.'" R.164 (Judgment and Order, at |7).
"Vested rights" is not a cause of action in and of itself. Rather, it is a
determination that is made by the court that allows a property owner to pursue a
particular land use under a preexisting zoning ordinance. Vested rights may be the basis
of, for example, an action seeking to overturn a municipality's decision under LUDMA, a
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss and the
transcript of the hearing on the City's motion for summary judgment and motion
to dismiss. See Brief of Appellant, at p.2. HTC does not identify any specific
instances in the record where it argued that the equitable nature of its claims
exempts it from complying with the UGIA's notice requirements. A general cite
to the record is not sufficient to satisfy the burden imposed under Wilde.
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takings claim, or claim of zoning estoppel,7 but it is not itself a separate cause of action.
Under Utah law, vested rights are tied to the issue of retroactive application of
zoning laws. Under the vested rights doctrine, an applicant for a land use application is
entitled to favorable action "if the application conforms to the zoning ordinance in effect
at the time of the application, unless changes in the zoning ordinances are pending which
would prohibit the use applied for, or unless the municipality can show a compelling
reason for exercising its police power retroactively to the date of application." W. Land
Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah 1980). See also Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-9a-509(l) (entitling an applicant to approval of a land use application if the
application "conforms to the requirements of the municipality's land use maps, zoning
map, and applicable land use ordinance in effect when a complete application is
submitted" unless (i) the land use authority "finds that a compelling, countervailing
public interest would be jeopardized" by approval of the application or (ii) a municipality
has initiated proceedings to amend the applicable land use ordinance at the time the
application is submitted).

It is noteworthy that HTC has in fact asserted each of these claims. Consequently,
a claim for "vested rights" was, at best, a restatement of HTC's First Claim for
Relief (Arbitrary, Capricious and/or Illegal Decision), Third Claim for Relief
(Takings), and Fifth Claim for Relief (Estoppel).
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The cases cited by HTC in its brief do not substantiate their assertion that the Utah
courts have consistently recognized vested rights as a cause of action. Brief of Appellant,
at p. 16. Rather, the cases HTC cites simply explain the concept of vested rights. It is
noteworthy that HTC has not identified any place in the record where HTC has ever
alleged that Holladay improperly applied a new zoning ordinance retroactively.
Furthermore, a failure to make a timely objection at the trial court level is
equivalent to a waiver. Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 931 (Utah
1993) (finding that in order to preserve an issue regarding the admission of evidence, a
party claiming error must object on the record in a timely fashion and a failure to make
such an objection will be deemed a waiver of the issue) {citing Hansen v. Stewart, 761
P.2d 14, 16 (Utah 1988)). Similarly, HTC's failure to rebut the City's argument that
"vested rights" is not a legitimate cause of action should be deemed a waiver of the issue
and a failure to preserve the issue for appeal.
The District Court correctly held that "vested rights" is not a claim in and of itself.
HTC never disputed this issue in the District Court and therefore waived the issue on
appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the District Court's grant of
summary judgment against all of HTC's claims for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies and failure to provide notice under UGIA, as well as the District Court's
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dismissal of HTC's claim for vested rights for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
DATED this /^ctay of January, 2008.
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER LLP

By
h Craig Hal(\
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Attorneys for Holladay City
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